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ABSTRACT 
The history of scientific research on the matter of the behavior of investors goes as far as 
the 16th century.  
However, most scrutiny and accomplishments occurred in the past century, and for most of 
that period the great debate has been centered on the question of market efficiency. The 
discussion has started in the 1960s and until this day there is still debate. 
Accordingly, in this study, I investigate if there is a technical trading rule, from a set of 
well-known trading rules, which can generate abnormal returns on the intraday data from 
the FTSE 100 Index from the period starting in January 2000 to December 2010. In other 
words, I try to attest for the validity of the weak form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(EMH). 
More precisely, I define and implement 5680 trading rules that use past information and 
test if they provide abnormal returns, testing the statistical significance of the results with 
the Superior Predictive Ability (SPA) test by Hansen (2005). 
In that regard, the study allow to confirm the validity of the weak form of the EMH, since 
no tested rule can systematically outperform a buy and hold strategy. This result comes as 
no surprise considering the results achieve by similar studies, such as Marshall et al. (2008) 
Bajgrowicz and Scaillet (2012), Duvignage et al. (2013) and Chaboud et al. (2014). 
These results contrast with other studies that also use trading rules with intraday data and 
refute the EMH. However their conclusions were not based on robust tests to data 
snooping. 
 In addition, further conclusions can be traced considering the duration and number of 
trades. The less time a portfolio is on the market for a given rule, the better is its 
performance. This can be indicative that the rules tested don’t generate value on their own 
merits, instead their results may simply be due to luck and to a small exposure to the 
market. 
 
 
 
 
 
Key words: Technical analysis; Intraday data; Superior Predictive Ability test; 
Efficient Market Hypothesis.  
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RESUMO 
O início da história do conhecimento científico relativo ao comportamento do investidor é 
datado ao século XVI. 
Contudo, somente no último século o assunto tem vindo a ser alvo de maior atenção, e na 
maior parte desse período tem-se debatido a questão da eficiência dos mercados. A 
discussão começou na década de 60 e ainda hoje se debate. 
Por consequência, neste estudo tento investigar a existência de uma técnica de transação de 
um conjunto de técnicas, pertencentes à análise técnica, de conhecimento prévio e bem 
documentadas na literatura, que consiga gerar rendibilidades anormais nos dados 
intradiários do índice FTSE 100, no período com inicio em Janeiro de 2000 e término em 
Dezembro de 2010. 
Em detalhe, foram definidas e implementadas 5680 regras de transação que usam 
informação histórica, testando se geram rendibilidades anormais com o recurso ao teste 
SPA de Hansen (2005). 
Nesse sentido, o estudo permitiu confirmar a validade da forma fraca da teoria dos 
mercados eficientes, uma vez que nenhuma regra testada conseguiu, sistematicamente, 
bater o mercado. Este resultado não é de todo uma surpresa considerando os resultados 
obtidos por estudos do género, por exemplo Marshall et al. (2008) Bajgrowicz e Scaillet 
(2012), Duvignage et al. (2013) e Chaboud et al. (2014). 
Esses resultados contrastam com outros estudos que também usaram regras de transação 
com dados intradiários e refutaram a teoria dos mercados eficientes. Contudo, essas 
conclusões não se fundamentaram em testes de robustez ao snooping dos dados. 
Adicionalmente, podem-se presumir ulteriores conclusões tendo em consideração a 
duração e o número de transações. Quanto menor o tempo de exposição do portfolio no 
mercado para uma determinada regra, melhor é a sua performance. Isto pode ser sinal de 
que as regras testadas não conseguem gerar valor por si só, pelo contrário, os seus 
resultados parecem ser obtidos de uma combinação de aleatoriedade e pouca exposição ao 
mercado. 
 
 
 
Palavras-chave: Análise técnica; Base de dados intradiária; Teste Superior Predictive 
Ability; Teoria dos mercados eficientes.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
For most of its life, the field of finance as debated the question of market efficiency. The 
discussion has started in the 1960s and until this day there is still debate, be it among 
academics or practitioners, about the question of markets efficiency. 
Among the scientific research on modern Finance those studies that are rated amongst the 
most influential on the matter are the 1953 Maurice Kendall’s study that brought to light 
the random movement of stock prices, coined as the random walk hypothesis (Kendall, 
1953), and 1965 Eugene Fama’s work presenting, for the first time, the concept and 
definition of efficient markets. As he puts it, in an efficient market information is reflected 
on market prices, and thus prices should follow a random walk (Fama, 1965). Although 
this theory would later suffer some alterations by its own author (Fama, 1970, 1991), the 
underlying idea of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) is that a market is efficient if 
the prices fully reflect all available information.  
Moreover, Fama defines the EMH in three forms, the weak form that implies that markets 
are efficient, reflecting all market historical information, the semi-strong form according to 
which the market is efficient reflecting all publicly available information, and finally the 
strong form that defines an efficient market in the sense that prices reflect all information 
both public and private (Fama, 1970). 
Through the decades that followed these theories have been put under scrutiny, with 
several studies coming forward with contrary ideas. But in essence most of the academic 
world accepts the EMH and the random walk hypothesis. 
The same cannot be said about practitioners, laying here the great discrepancy between the 
two sides of this area. Some market participants state that it is possible to predict the 
movements of the market just by taking into account the past prices and movements 
(technical analysis), which goes against the EMH. 
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For example, studies on the matter, such as Carter and Van Auken (1990), Allen and 
Taylor (1992), Lui and Mole (1998), and Oberlenchner (2001), consistently find that the 
practitioners emphasize technical analysis over fundamental analysis the shorter the time 
frame of forecasting. According to Marshall et al. (2008) practitioners place twice as much 
importance on technical analysis for intraday horizons when compared with a longer 
horizon of one year. 
Consequently, it is only fitting that given the referred importance that practitioners deposit 
on technical trading, especially on short periods of time, and the abundance of studies, 
even those using intraday data, that find evidence for and against, the question of the 
profitability of the technical analysis, and thus the markets efficiency, remains current for 
both academics and market participants. 
Accordingly, with this study, I investigate if there is a technical trading rule, from a set of 
well-known trading rules, which can generate abnormal returns on the Financial Times 
Stock Exchange (FTSE) 100 Index from the period starting in January 2000 to December 
2010. 
In order to accomplish those goals, from the several existing ways to test the weak form of 
the EMH, I define and implement trading rules that use past information and test if they 
provide abnormal returns (Lo et al., 2000; Jegadeesh, 2000). 
Finally, in order to test the statistical significance of the results I use the Superior 
Predictive Ability test by Hansen (2005). 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The knowledge about human behavior when one is faced with investment decisions has 
evolved substantially since Keynes’s animal spirits theory, resulting from the book entitled 
The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (Keynes, 1936). This theory 
conveys that the investor takes decisions based on random-like thinking, in such way that 
the stock market is comparable with a beauty contest. More precisely, Keynes says that 
“most, probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of which 
will be drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken as a result of animal spirits, 
of a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted 
average of benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities”. 
In fact, this chapter follows with a review of the literature on the area which is subject to 
this study, intraday trading, more specifically the part dedicated to technical analysis. Since 
this is narrowly connected with the definition of the market efficiency and the random 
walk hypothesis I also present a small recap of the state of knowledge on the subject. 
Consequently I start by presenting a brief summary of the academic advances that led to, 
and followed, the formulation of the random walk hypothesis, and the EMH. More 
precisely, its origin, motivation, definition and the evolution on the literature about the 
subject, that presents strong arguments in favor and against it. 
To end the chapter, I define and present statistical tests that account for data snooping used 
for studies in financial economics. 
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2.1. Modern Finance, the random walk hypothesis and EMH 
The history of scientific research on the matter of the behavior of investors goes a long 
way back. According to Sewell (2011) it can be traced as far as the 16th century, when 
Girolamo Cardano, an Italian mathematician, wrote that “the most fundamental principle 
of all in gambling is simply equal conditions, e.g. of opponents, of bystanders, of money, 
of situation, of the dice box, and of the die itself. To the extent to which you depart from 
that equality, if it is in your opponents favor, you are a fool, and if in your own, you are 
unjust”. Since then the evolution of the scientific knowledge on the matter has been 
constantly evolving. 
However, on the subject of the modern finance and more precisely the subject of technical 
analysis and the efficiency of the markets, most changes on the perception that we have 
about the role of the investor in the markets has occurred in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, 
fundamentally due to researchers such as Milton Friedman, Paul Samuelson, Maurice 
Kendall, Eugene Fama, Kenneth French, and Michael Jensen. 
The most significant advances on this field started in 1953, when Milton Friedman pointed 
out that, due to arbitrage, the case for the EMH (which only latter would be presented and 
defined as we know it now) can be made even in situations where the trading strategies of 
investors are correlated (Friedman, 1953). 
In the same year the first effort was made to make public the randomness of the movement 
of stock prices, by Maurice Kendall. He analyzed 22 price-series at weekly intervals and 
found that they were random (Kendall, 1953). 
Later on, around 1955, it was credited to Louis Bachilier’s work on his PhD in 
mathematics from 1900, later published in book form entitled The Game, the Chance and 
the Hazard (translated from the original Le Jeu, la Chance et le Hasard) from 1914, a first 
insight on the theory presented in 1953 by Kendall (Bernstein, 1992).  
Effectively, according to Bachelier, “past, present and even discounted future events are 
reflected in market price, but often show no apparent relation to price changes” and “if the 
market, in effect, does not predict its fluctuations, it does assess them as being more or less 
likely, and this likelihood can be evaluated mathematically” (Dimson and Mussavian, 
2000). 
Nevertheless, the first criticism to the random walk hypothesis did not take long to appear. 
In 1961, Houthakker resorted to stop-loss sell orders, finding patterns on the prices, and 
finding also leptokurtosis, nonstationarity and non-linearity (Houthakker, 1961). 
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In the year that followed, Mandelbrot suggested that the tails of the distribution of returns 
follow a power law (Mandelbrot, 1962). Cootner went as far as suggesting that the stock 
market do not follow a random walk (Cootner, 1962), and Osborne found out that stocks 
tend to be traded in concentrated bursts, which is a deviation from a simple random walk 
(Osborne, 1962). 
For some of those criticisms there are possible explanations within the framework of the 
random walk hypothesis. For example, the model for error clustering by Berger and 
Mandelbrot (1963) serves as justification for the Mandelbrot’s critique in the previous year 
(Sewell, 2011), and the spectral analysis on market prices made by Granger and 
Morgenstern (1963) allowed them to conclude that short-run movements of the series obey 
the simple random walk hypothesis. 
The situation described before persisted in the subsequent years, with the arrival of several 
studies in favor or against the random walk hypothesis and the EMH (Bernstein, 1992; Lo, 
1997; Dimson and Mussavian, 1998; Farmer and Lo, 1999; Sewell, 2011). 
The most prominent works in favor of such theories began with Eugene Fama’s discussion 
of Mandelbrot’s work in previous years, namely the stable paretian hypothesis, concluding 
that the tested market data conforms to the distribution (Fama, 1963). 
Godfrey et al. (1964) tested the random walk hypothesis on the stock market, concluding 
that it is the only mechanism that is consistent on describing the “unrestrained pursuit of 
the profit motive by the participants in the market”. 
In the following year, Eugene Fama reviews previous studies and concludes that there is 
strong evidence in favor of the random walk hypothesis, presenting, for the first time, a 
definition of the concept of efficient markets (Fama, 1965). 
Still in 1965, Paul Samuelson contributes for an extension on the perception of the markets 
efficiency, focusing on a martingale process instead of a random walk, and stating that “in 
competitive markets there is a buyer for every seller. If one could be sure that a price 
would rise, it would have already risen” (Samuelson, 1965). 
This is followed by 1966 Mandelbrot’s work, where he concludes that in competitive 
markets with rational risk-neutral investors, returns are unpredictable, thus prices follow a 
martingale (Mandelbrot, 1966).  
In 1967, Roberts introduces for the first time the distinction between weak and strong form 
of the market efficiency (Roberts, 1967). While Fama et al. (1969), considered the first 
ever event study, concluded that the stock markets are indeed efficient. 
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Fama (1970) defined an efficient market as a market where prices reflect all the available 
information, also making the distinction between weak form, semi-strong form and strong 
form of the EMH. 
The decade that followed brought some other relevant studies, from which stand out 
Makiel (1973), Samuelson (1973), Grossman (1976), Fama (1976), and Jensen (1978). The 
last one introduced the distinction between the statistical and the economic efficiency. 
Jensen stated that a market is efficient with respect to a specific information set, if it is 
impossible to make economic profits by trading on the basis of that information set. 
Adding that “by economic profits, we mean the risk adjusted returns net of all costs” 
(Jensen, 1978). 
In other words, Jensen intended to show that even if one can prove a market is inefficient 
by analyzing its prices, the same conclusion can be proved wrong when an investor tries to 
replicate the techniques and processes evaluated, since there are costs associated to each 
buy and sell operation. This is of most importance as most of studies relied on an approach 
that not accounted for costs and, mistakenly, draw conclusions against the EMH from the 
results obtained. 
These studies were followed in the next decades by publications of the like of Black 
(1986), Eun and Shim (1989), Fama (1991, 1998), Makiel (1992, 2003), Metcalf and 
Malkiel (1994), Chan et al. (1997), Lewellen and Shanken (2002), Chen and Yeh (2002), 
Lo (2008), and Yen and Lee (2008). All of them favoring the case of the EMH and the 
random walk hypothesis. 
Even more recently, Bajgrowicz and Scaillet (2012) attest on favor of the markets 
efficiency. In this study the authors test the performance of technical trading rules on the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) index in the period from 1897 to 2011, using the 
false discovery rate (FDR), a new approach to data snooping, and proving wrong Brock et 
al. (1992), a similar study that used basically the same database and technical trading rules, 
but that led to different conclusions. 
In the opposite side of the discussion there were also several studies trying to refute the 
random walk hypothesis as well as the EMH.  
Indeed some of the most notable work, at an initial stage, was done by Sydney S. 
Alexander (Alexander, 1961, 1964), who concluded that the Standard and Poors (S&P) 
industrial index did not follow a random walk. Being followed by De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985), study where the authors discovered overreaction on the stock prices. This study is 
considered, by many, as the start of the behavioral finance research. 
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Additionally, Eugene Fama and Keneth French find, in 1988, that 25 to 40 percent of the 
variation of long horizon returns is predictable from past returns (Fama and French, 1988).  
Whereas, Chan et al. (1996) found evidence that markets respond gradually to new 
information leading to periods of mispricing. 
An extended number of other studies, also making the case against the EMH, accompanied 
these works. 
In the decades of 1960 an 1970 the most notable works were accomplished by Steiger 
(1964), Granger and Morgenstern (1970), Kemp and Reid (1971), Beja (1977), and Ball 
(1978). 
In the following decades the critiques rose in number with the works of the like of 
Grossman and Stiglitz, (1980), LeRoy and Porter (1981), Stiglitz (1981), Shiller (1981, 
1989, 2000), Roll (1984), Summers (1986), Keim and Stambaugh (1986), French and Roll 
(1986), Lo and MacKinlay (1988, 1999), Cutler et al. (1989), Laffont and Maskin (1990), 
Lehmann (1990), Jegadeesh (1990), Chopra et al. (1992), Bekaert and Hodrick (1992), 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Huang and Stoll (1994), Haugen (1995, 1999), Bernstein 
(1999), and Shleifer (2000) only to mention a few.  
Even in the most recent years literature still emerges against the EMH (Wilson and 
Marashdeh, 2007; Lee et al., 2010). 
This schism and continuous exchange of arguments is well summarized by Schwert in the 
article Anomalies and Market Efficiency, where he identifies the documented anomalies, 
finding that most of them disappeared, perhaps revealing some ephemeral market 
inefficiencies, finding also other new anomalies (Schwert, 2002). 
 
2.2. Intraday technical analysis 
Effectively one can conclude that this is an area of great debate and thus of great 
importance in Finance, be it for academics or practitioners.  
In fact here lies the great discrepancy between the two sides of this area. In one hand we 
have the academics who, despite the divergences made clear above, always favored the 
idea that it is not possible to predict future price movements using the past price 
movements (technical analysis). In the other hand there are the market participants among 
whom there is the perception that it is possible to predict the movements of the market just 
by taking into account the past prices and movements. 
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The same statute of schism is not applicable to fundamental analysis. According to Lo et 
al. (2000), “it has been argued that the difference between fundamental analysis and 
technical analysis is not unlike the difference between astronomy and astrology”, 
complementing that “among some circles, technical analysis is known as “voodoo 
finance”. 
Additionally, Lo et al. (2000) point out that the explanation behind this difference of 
treatment could be associated with the “unique and sometimes impenetrable jargon used by 
technical analysts”, adding that “some of which has developed into a standard lexicon that 
can be translated”. Be it as it may, the truth is that the discrepancy of treatment of the two 
approaches is very different depending if the subject is an academic or market participant. 
The disposition of academics towards technical analysis, or charting as it is also referred, is 
well put by Makiel: “Technical analysis is anathema to the academic world. We love to 
pick on it. Our bullying tactics are prompt by two considerations: (1) the method is 
patently false; and (2) it is easy to pick on. And while it may seem a bit unfair to pick on 
such a sorry target, just remember: it is your money we are trying to save” (Makiel, 1981). 
Regardless, studies on the matter, such as Carter and Van Auken (1990), Allen and Taylor 
(1992), Lui and Mole (1998), and Oberlenchner (2001), consistently find that the market 
participants emphasize technical analysis over fundamental analysis the shorter the time 
frame of forecasting. According to Marshall et al. (2008) they place twice as much 
importance on technical analysis for intraday horizons when compared with a longer 
horizon of one year. 
This notion is a lot more relevant when authors such as Manahov et al. (2014) state that the 
discrepancy between academic studies related to technical trading, in the Foreign 
Exchange (FX) market, and practitioners is largely due to the fact that academic research 
limits their trading strategies to daily observations. 
Having that in mind, the study of intraday technical analysis becomes of great importance 
on the matter of market efficiency. 
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To the best of my knowledge, the first study published using a higher trading frequency 
came up in 1985 entitled An investigation of transactions data for NYSE stocks by Wood et 
al. (1985). On it the authors tested a large sample of New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
stocks, examining them on a minute-by-minute transaction data period over two time 
periods, from September 1971 to February 1972 (data from 946 stocks) and the entire 
calendar year of 1982 (data from 1138 stocks). They found evidence of differences in 
return distributions among trades occurring overnight, during the first thirty minutes of 
trading day, at market close and during the rest of the day. Moreover, they realize that all 
positive returns are earned during the first thirty minute of the trading day and at the 
market close, and that in the rest of the day market returns are normally distributed and 
autocorrelation is substantially reduced (Wood et al., 1985). 
Almost a decade later, Froot and Perold (1995) examine short-run autocorrelation of stock-
index returns, finding that it has been declining dramatically in recent years. Over the 
period of 1983-1989 the returns on S&P 500 went from being highly positively correlated 
to practically uncorrelated. The paper shows that positive index autocorrelation found in 
earlier studies was a result of high autocorrelation on the 1960s and 1970s, vanishing by 
the late 1980s. The explanation for such is attributed to “inefficient processing of market-
wide information”, pointing out “that recent technological and institutional improvements 
in the processing of this information has removed much of the autocorrelation”. In their 
study the authors used 15 minute returns, and they did not test for data mining. 
Los (1999) tests and concludes that none of nine Asian currencies exhibited complete 
efficiency during the year of 1997. The author tested the stationarity and the serial 
independence of the price changes on minute-by-minute data for nine currencies during the 
period starting in January 1, 1997 to December, 30 1997, and, as Froot and Perold (1995), 
he did not conduct data snooping tests. 
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Already on the new millennium, Busse and Green (2002) examine the influence of live TV 
analysis on individual stocks during the trading day. In that regard they test 322 individual 
stocks featured on Morning Call and Midday Call of the network CNBC - Consumer News 
and Business Chanel (both programs are highly regarded by market participants). They use 
the simple mean of the intraday price changes and conduct the nonparametric bootstrap 
algorithm from Barclay and Litzenberger (1988) to determine the statistical significance. 
The conclusions to which they arrive are that in one hand the prices adjust within seconds 
of the initial mention, and in the other hand, traders who execute within 15 seconds of the 
initial mention make small but significant profits by trading on positive reports. In this 
study, the authors focus is not the market efficiency per se, rather the time of response 
from prices to news and big announcements. Even though, the fact that at a given period of 
time there are investors who can profit from stock prices, taking only into account past 
patterns (in this case a specific TV show indication and the market reaction to it), attests 
for market inefficiencies. 
In the ensuing year, Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002) go on favor of the market efficiency, 
since they conclude that the bond market is quick to incorporate information, even at short 
return horizons. To get to that conclusion the authors used a dataset based on daily and 
hourly transactions for 55 high-yeld bonds included on the Fixed Income Pricing System 
(FIPS) from the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) between January 1995 
and October 1995. 
An opposite view is portrayed by Cassese and Guidolin (2004), once they examine the 
pricing and informational efficiency of the most important Italian stock index, the Milano 
Italia Borsa 30 (MIB30), in the period from April, 6 1999 to January, 31 2000. They found 
it quite inefficient, with a numerous percentage of the analyzed data (up to 40% of the 
data) violating non-arbitrage condition. Although, in order to reach to that conclusion, the 
authors did not account for transaction costs, they state that, even if transaction costs are 
considered, there are significant arbitrage opportunities. 
Chordia et al. (2005) study the stocks listed on the NYSE from 1993 to 2002 and conclude 
that daily returns are not serially correlated while order imbalances on the same stocks are 
highly persistent. The authors add that this is due to the fact investors react promptly to 
order imbalances, taking 5 to 60 minutes in the process, also that short-term (5 minutes) 
return predictability has been declining and that market liquidity and efficiency are 
positively correlated. The authors did not conduct any significant test to control for data 
mining. 
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At their turn, Marshal et al. (2008) conclude that, for the Standard and Poor’s Depository 
Receipts (SPDR), intraday technical analysis is not profitable. The authors tested 7846 
technical trading rules on data from 2002 and 2003, and controlled for data snooping 
through the application of the Brock et al. (1992) bootstrap methodology and the Sullivan 
et al. (1999) reality check test. 
Chordia et al. (2008) perform a study on a sample of large and actively traded NYSE firms 
over a period of ten years (from 1993 to 2002) complemented later by Chung and Hrazdil 
(2010) on a broader study that included all NYSE traded firms. Both papers focus on the 
dynamics between liquidity and market efficiency, leading to the (same) conclusion that 
there is positive correlation between the two variables, being the effect amplified during 
periods of information release. In other words, according to both studies, liquidity 
enhances market efficiency. 
A few years later, Scholstus and Dijk (2012) tried to find the relationship between the 
speed of trading and its performance. In order to accomplish it, the authors used data from 
S&P500, National Association of Securities Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) 100 and 
Russell 2000, from the period from January 6 of 2009 to September 30 of 2009. The study 
revealed that speed has an important role on the performance of the technical trading rules, 
being the ones with lower delays those with better (positive) average returns. 
Other recent study that gave ground to the EMH was published in 2013. The authors tested 
the intraday predictive power using technical trading strategies on the 30 constituents of 
the DJIA index. They concluded that there is no abnormal return over the buy-and-hold 
strategy (Duvinage et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, according to Chaboud et al. (2014), that focused on high frequency 
algorithmic trading on the FX, there is an improvement on price efficiency and a reduction 
on arbitrage opportunities associated primarily with automated (computer generated) 
trading. 
Manahov et al. (2014) found evidence of statistical and economical significance of excess 
returns on the FX, even after accounting for the transaction costs. In this study, the authors 
did not conduct a robustness test on their results. 
Indeed the existing literature on intraday technical analysis seems to be skewed on favor of 
the EMH and the random walk hypothesis, since most of studies point out that, after the 
consideration of transaction costs and data snooping measures, there are no trading 
strategies that can, consistently, beat the market, even considering trading strategies with 
shorter time frames. 
28 CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW 
Nonetheless, the fact that there is still some literature that try and succeed in finding flaws 
to the EMH and the random walk hypothesis, attest for the validity, even nowadays, of the 
question of the markets efficiency. 
 
2.3. Data snooping measures 
According to Leamer (1978) the empirical tests in financial economics which are free from 
data instigated biases are close to none. So in this kind of studies there is always the risk 
that the results are driven by data mining.  
Following the same path, Lo et al. (1990) states that tests of financial asset pricing models 
may result in misleading inferences when properties of the data are used to construct the 
test statistics. Such tests are often based on returns to portfolios of common stock, where 
portfolios are constructed by sorting on some empirically motivated characteristic of the 
securities such as market value of equity. 
Dimson and Marsh (1990) finds that “even apparently innocuous forms of data-snooping 
significantly enhance reported forecast quality, and that relatively sophisticated forecasting 
methods operated without data-snooping often perform worse than naive benchmarks”. 
Moreover, Brock et al. (1992) adds that “the more scrutiny a collection of data receives, 
the more likely “interesting” spurious patterns will be observed”. 
In order to illustrate the conundrum of data snooping, Bajgrowicz and Scaillet (2012) use a 
good anecdote. They state the following, “imagine you put enough monkeys on typewriters 
and that one of the monkeys writes The Iliad in ancient Greek. Because of the sheer size of 
the sample, you are likely to find a lucky monkey once in a while. Would you bet any 
money that he is going to write The Odyssey next?”. 
The same argument can be applied to trading rules. If one looks hard enough, a trading rule 
will eventually generate abnormal returns, even if it lacks predictive ability. 
Indeed, a good part of the literature evidence in favor of the predictive ability of technical 
trading rules can be draw back to studies made without accounting for data snooping 
biases. This is an issue that is transversal to most studies that were undertaken in the past, 
for both intraday and daily datasets. 
Examples of this effect are Brock et al. (1992), Levich and Thomas (1993) and Osler and 
Chang (1999). 
The possibilities to avoid such problems have been under greater discussion for the past 30 
years, with special focus in the past decade.  
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In fact, Brock et al. (1992) presents a study were the authors conduct a test of significance 
for the set of technical trading rules employed, through the use of bootstrap. 
Diebold and Mariano (1995) produces a test intended to compare forecast, but actually has 
been largely used to compare models. However, Giacomini and White (2003) refers that 
this test is conservative when applied to short-horizon forecasts, since the model 
parameters are estimated using a rolling window of data, rather than an expanding one. 
Other example of a well documented and widely used test is the reality check for data 
snooping (RC) of White (2000). The author created a test for comparing multiple 
forecasting models or rules. This procedure compares the total number of rules or models 
under estimation to a benchmark, and tests if the benchmark is significantly outperformed 
by any model used in that comparison. 
This test would be refined by Hansen (2005), in the sense that it accounts for the variation 
of the outperformance of each model compared with the benchmark. This relative 
calculation results in a test less sensitive to the inclusion of poor and irrelevant alternatives. 
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3. DATA 
For the purpose of the study, I used the intraday database on the FTSE 100 Index available 
on the School of Economics and Management, at the University of Minho. This database 
aggregates a total of 11 years of data, from January 2000 until December 2010, which, 
compared to the data commonly used on existing literature, is a considerable time frame, 
being, from a theoretical point of view, large enough to deliver robust results. 
On the remainder of this chapter, I present a summary of the data on the database, some 
checks that were done in order to guarantee that there are no values mistakenly 
incorporated in the database, the aggregation of the data into lower frequencies, and, 
finally, the description of the risk free used. 
 
3.1. Summary 
The database has a total of 20,188,968 observations, distributed annually as showed on 
Table 1.  
More precisely, from 2000 to 2008 there are about half a million observations each year, 
whereas in the last two years that number increases for more than 1.3 million in 2009, and 
more than 14 million in 2010. This happens because prior to December 2009 prices were 
made recorded on a 15 seconds interval (approximately), and from that date on prices 
entries were made with greater frequency (they were registered as changes occurred). 
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Table 1 - Database number of observations by year. 
Year Number of observations 
2000 507,628 
2001 463,828 
2002 461,734 
2003 471,774 
2004 495,214 
2005 495,707 
2006 498,224 
2007 455,235 
2008 516,510 
2009 1,331,934 
2010 14,491,180 
 
3.2. Data verification 
According to the London Stock Exchange Group (LSEG) the trading hours for the FTSE 
100 index starts at 08:00 and ends at 16:30 Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), except on the 
last working day preceding Christmas and New Year’s Eve, when it opens at 08:00 and 
closes at 12:30 GMT (London Stock Exchange Group - Official website of the London 
stock exchange, 2016). 
Accordingly, the first and last daily observations on the database are presented on Figure 1 
and on Figure 2, respectively.  
Regarding the first daily observation, as expected, most of them occur precisely at 8 am. 
Even though, there are a few days where the first observation is not at 8 am or at an 
approximate time. In fact some days have the first entry from as late as 10 am. Besides that 
there are other values worthy of attention, exactly 3 prices which are registered past 12:00. 
On the same premise, the last daily observation (represented on Figure 2) was also verified. 
Here, the observations are not in line with the first ones in each trading day. There a lot 
more discrepancies on the last recorded price. 
For both cases, I conduct some verifications. I start by verifying if there are any reasons for 
those abnormal time stamps, and found that there are technical reasons for some of them. 
Then I proceed to compare the prices on the database to the prices on other database, 
namely the Thomson Reuters/Datastream database, and concluded that there are no major 
errors on the database and therefore decided to keep all records. 
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I also checked if there are any records outside trading days. 
In order to do that, I resorted to the institutional website of the United Kingdom (UK) 
government, obtaining the bank holidays on which it is not supposed to exist observations. 
After verification, no observations were found on weekends or holidays (UK Government. 
Official website of the UK government services and information, 2016). 
Furthermore, there are a few working days when there are no observations, for example the 
9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center. 
Next, I checked for the existence of observations off chronological order. Indeed there 
were 81 prices that entered off the correct chronological order. Those entries were 
eliminated from the dataset. 
 
 
Figure 1 – First daily observation. 
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Figure 2 – Last daily observation. 
 
3.3. Data aggregation 
When looking to Table 1 the main characteristic from the data that stands out is the 
different number of observations in the last two years compared to the previous ones. Such 
difference, as said before, is due to the change on the time frequency of the records of 
index values in the database. 
Since all trading rules considered assume that returns are calculated over the same time 
period, I aggregated returns to a five minute interval. 
The time frame of 5 minutes was chosen in accordance to other studies, such as Marshall et 
al. (2008). 
 
3.4. Risk free rate 
For the purpose of the analysis, the risk free rate used was obtained from the 
Thomson/Reuters database. The risk free rate here considered is the pound overnight 
middle rate provided by the Bank of England.  
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4. METHODOLOGY 
In order to find if there is a technical trading rule that can generate abnormal, risk adjusted, 
returns, in other words, to test the weak form of the EMH, there are three common 
approaches. One is to find and test some kind of calendar regularity or anomaly; another 
form consists in analyzing the properties of the series (e.g. sample correlations, run tests, 
variance ratio tests); and yet another approach is to implement trading rules that use past 
information. 
In fact, I use the later. In accordance, I define and implement trading rules that use past 
information and test if they provide abnormal returns (Lo et al., 2000; Jegadeesh, 2000). 
Effectively, the set of technical trading rules employed on the study were the ones 
purposed by several other studies, e.g. Sullivan et al. (1999), Marshall et al. (2008), 
Bajgrowicz and Scaillet (2012). Those techniques are known previously to the period of 
the data under analysis, hence avoiding data mining issues (Marshall et al., 2008). 
Finally, for the test of profitability it is often used the Brock et al. (1992) bootstrapping 
methodology, the White’s Reality Check bootstrapping technique for data snooping 
(Sullivan et al., 1999, 2001, White, 2000), and the Superior Predictive Ability test (Hansen, 
2005). 
On this study I use the Superior Predictive Ability test (Hansen, 2005), from now on 
referred as SPA test, since it is more powerful and less sensitive to the inclusion of poor 
and irrelevant alternatives, when compared to the other approaches (Hansen, 2005). 
Indeed, in the reminder of this chapter I present definitions for the technical trading rules 
employed, the measurements of performance and then, in more depth, the test to assess the 
statistical significance of the results. 
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4.1. Technical Trading Rules 
Regarding the technical trading rules employed on this study, I looked for rules that were 
of common knowledge prior to the time frame of the data under analysis. This, according 
to Lakonishok and Smidt (1988), Lo and MacKinlay (1990), and Pesaran and Timmerman 
(1995), tends to avoid data snooping bias. This is well put by Marshall et al. (2008), “the 
application of new trading rules, or new specifications of existing trading rules, to 
historical data introduces the chance of data snooping bias. It is quite possible that the rules 
have been tailored to the data series in question and are only profitable because of this”. 
Effectively, the rules employed were from four families of trading rules, filter rules, 
moving averages, support and resistance, and channel breakouts, used on several studies on 
the subject, such as Brock et al. (1992), Sullivan et al. (1999), Marshall et al. (2008) and 
Bajgrowicz & Scaillet (2012). 
On Table 2 are presented the number of technical trading rules used on the study. A total of 
5680 rules were tested, 600 of the filter rules, 3780 of the moving averages, 180 of the 
support and resistance and 1120 of the channel breakouts family. 
 
Table 2 - Number of technical trading rules used. 
Family of trading rules Number of rules 
Filter rules 600 
Moving averages 3780 
Support and resistance 180 
Channel breakouts 1120 
Total 5680 
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4.1.1. Filter rules 
In order to define and implement the trading rules from the filter rules family, first used by 
Alexander (1961), I resorted to Fama and Blume (1966) and to Sullivan et al. (1999). Both 
papers state that when a daily closing price of a security moves up or down at least x per 
cent (being x a value to be defined) one should buy and hold that security, or short sell, 
respectively. From there, each subsequent day, one should check the closing price, 
watching for two different possibilities, if the price goes down (or rises on the second 
scenario) for more than x per cent the following action should be to sell (buy) the security, 
otherwise if the price goes up (down) it becomes the price of reference for it to be 
compared to the closing price in the next day, on all other price movements the position 
remains unchanged. 
Since the database used is not composed of daily prices, but rather of intraday prices, the 
definitions cited for daily prices should be adapted accordingly. So the “closing price” is 
assumed as the last price prior to the current period under consideration. 
Additionally to the standard filter rules described, there are some variations that I consider 
for this study. 
Starting with the price of reference, which on the standard form is the subsequent high 
(low) if the position is long (short), it can be also defined as the most recent price that is 
greater (less) than the e previous prices. 
I also consider the possibility of a neutral position to be taken when the price decreases 
(increases) y percent from the previous high (low).With y less than x. 
Finally, another variation to the standard filter is imposed by allowing a position to be 
held, be it long or short, for a given, c, number of periods, ignoring all other signals 
generated during that period. 
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4.1.2. Moving averages 
Moving averages are among the groups of trading rules with wider use and discussion on 
technical trading literature. Its usage dates to the 30s, when Gartley (1935) mentioned that 
“in an uptrend, long commitments are retained as long as the price trend remains above the 
moving average. Thus, when the price trend reaches a top, and turns downward, the 
downside penetration of the moving average is regarded as a sell signal… Similarly, in a 
downtrend, short average. Thus, when the price trend reaches a bottom, and turns upward, 
the upside penetration of the moving average is regarded as a buy signal”. 
Brock et al. (1992) stated that the idea behind this particular technique is to smooth out an 
otherwise volatile series. 
Accordingly, a buy signal is generated when the short-period moving average rises above 
the long-term moving average, and vice-versa, when the short-period moving average falls 
below the long–period moving average a sell signal is generated. Therefore, the portfolio is 
always on the market, either with long or short positions. 
As before, some variations of the standard moving averages were considered. 
The first variation was introduced by applying a band filter on the moving average, which 
resulted on the reduction of the number of buy and sell signals by eliminating what Brock 
et al. (1992) describes as “whiplash” signals when the long and short period moving 
averages are close. In other words, the fixed percentage band filter requires the buy or sell 
signal to exceed the moving average by a fixed multiplicative amount, b. 
The second variation considered was the time delay filter, which requires the buy or sell 
signal to be the same for a given number of periods, d. Only if a signal repeats itself for a 
number of periods equal to d, action is taken in order to act according to the signal. 
The third and final variation is the same as the one used for the Filter Rules (on 4.1.1). A 
position is held for c periods, ignoring all other signals during that period. 
 
4.1.3. Support and resistance 
Support and resistance is another group of technical trading rules with a well documented 
usage. According to Sullivan et al. (1999) it can be traced to Wyckoff (1910). 
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In its simplest form, a buy signal is generated when the price rises above the resistance 
level (local maximum). The logic behind this rule relies on the belief that many investors 
are willing to sell at a peak, leading to a potential selling pressure that causes resistance to 
the price penetration of the previous maximum. Though, if the price breaks through this 
pressure point and surpasses the resistance level, this should be perceived as a buy signal 
(Brock et al., 1992).  
The same reasoning can be followed for sell signals. If the price drops below the support 
level (local minimum) a sell signal is generated. 
As for the other groups of trading rules, I implemented some variations to the basic form 
defined above. Those were the same implemented for the moving averages, a fixed 
percentage band filter, b, a time delay filter, d, and position holding for c periods. 
 
4.1.4. Channel breakouts 
Sometimes referred to as the Dow line or Dow Theory, this technical trading rule has been 
around for more than a century. It was developed by Charles Dow, hence the titles coined 
to the rule, in the late years of the 19th century. 
The rule, later refined by William Hamilton (Hamilton, 1922) and better described by 
Robert Rhea (Rhea, 1932), states that one should buy when the closing price exceeds the 
channel and sell when the price moves below the channel. The channel occurs when the 
high over the previous n days is within x percent of the low over the previous n days, not 
including the current price (Sullivan et al., 1999). 
Again, the previous definitions are specifically focused for daily prices. For this study 
some considerations are made resulting in the definition that follows: if the maximum price 
of the previous n periods is less or equal to (1+x) times the minimum price of the same 
period, a channel occurs (1). Thus, and only after the previous condition is met, an 
evaluation is made to infer if the position to be held is long or short. The first occurs if the 
current price is higher than the maximum price of the previous n periods (2), the second 
when the opposite is verified (3). 
 
)1(PrminPrmax: xiceiceChannel  ,      (1) 
Where maxPrice is the highest price of the previous n periods, 
minPrice is the lowest price of the previous n periods. 
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        (2) 
 
iceicecurrent PrminPr 
        (3) 
 
Once again, variations of this basic form are considered. Namely, the fixed percent band 
filter, b, and the fixed number of periods, c, holding the same position. 
 
4.2. Performance measurement 
The results for the study were obtained following a simple algorithm, each trading rule 
generates an investment signal, 1, 0 or -1, respectively for a long, neutral and short 
position. According to Bajgrowicz and Scaillet (2012), other ways to manage the signals 
could be employed, but since the conclusion would be the same and this signals 
interpretation are fairly intuitive, I opted for this approach. 
Regarding the performance measurement of those returns, I followed the relevant literature 
on the matter and used the risk free rate as benchmark (Sullivan et al., 1999 and on Brock 
et al., 1992), gauging if the rules are able to generate absolute returns. The risk free rates 
used are the overnight interest rates given by the Bank of England. 
In detail, when the signal generated indicates to buy (1), I buy the index at the current 
price, if instead the signal is for a sell (-1), I go short on the index, and otherwise the 
portfolio is outside the market. For all that options, the portfolio is compared to the option 
of earning the risk free rate for the entire period. 
Furthermore, as seen on Marshall et al. (2008), I use the index as a benchmark as well. 
This is accomplished by doing the same as for the risk free rate, although in this approach 
the comparison is made over a long position on the index for the whole period. 
Finally, concerning the performance criteria, I use the simple mean return.  
 
4.3. Data snooping measures 
In order to avoid spurious patterns in the results I use the Superior Predictive Ability test 
by Hansen (2005). This consists in an evaluation of the trading rules in the context of the 
total group of rules, which reduces the significance of a rule if it is the only one presenting 
positive abnormal returns. In this case the null hypothesis is that the performance of the 
best trading rule is no better than the benchmark performance. 
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To be more specific, the SPA test checks if there is a trading rule with larger expected 
profit than the current rule.  
Take δk,t-1 (where k = 0, 1, …, m) as the set of possible decision rules (long, short or 
neutral) at time t-1, which are evaluated with a loss function, L(ξt, δt-h), where ξt is a 
random variable that represents the aspects of the decision problem that are unknown at the 
time the decision is made. A given trading rule profit, πk,t, is given by δk,t-1rt, where rt is the 
return on the asset in period t. 
In this study the random variable, ξt, assumes the value of rt, what makes the loss function, 
L(ξt, δt-h), equal to the profit of the benchmark, δk,t-1 rt (long position on the index). 
Given that, the performance, d, of the rule k, at time t, relative to the benchmark, is given 
by the following expression, 
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And the null hypothesis can then be as presented on (5), assuming an expected positive 
value for the performance of rule k at time t. 
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Furthermore, the test statistic is given by 
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And the estimator is given by 
 



 

ndn
k
c
k
kk
d
loglog2ˆ2
11ˆ

 ,  k=1,…,m      (7) 
Where 



  ndn kk loglog2ˆ2
11

is the indicator function. 
 
42 CHAPTER 4 - METHODOLOGY 
The test distribution is estimated by the stationary bootstrap of Politis and Romano (1994). 
The first step is to create time-series samples of the differences, and then calculate their 
sample average, 
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The test statistic requires estimates of its variance, 2k , for k=1,…,m. To obtain it under the 
null hypothesis, the bootstrap variable must be recentered, about lˆ , cˆ  or uˆ  by 
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Finally the test statistic is given by 
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And the p-value is 
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Where the null hypothesis is rejected for small values. Thus obtaining three values, one for 
each one of the estimators lˆ , cˆ  and uˆ . 
For a more detailed description of the procedure of this test please refer to Hansen (2005) 
and the references therein. 
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5. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The results of the trading rules can be analyzed in a multitude of ways. In particular, they 
can be evaluated with and without benchmarks, with and without measures to forecast 
accuracy, by group of rules, or by period. 
Faced with those possibilities, the approaches that I choose are the ones that, in a 
reasonable extent, in my opinion allow for an in depth analysis of the results. 
Consequently, follows a brief presentation of the average annualized returns, the excess 
returns obtained over both benchmarks, each made by year and for the entire period, and 
for each category of trading rules.  
Additionally, I extend the analysis by comparing the duration and the number of trades of 
the best rule, the winning (trading rules that yield positive returns) and the losing rules 
(trading rules that yield negative returns) in each of the trading categories. 
Finally, the results obtained for the SPA test are presented. 
 
5.1. Results for the average return criterion 
5.1.1. Overview 
The analysis of the results obtained for the entire period from January 2000 to December 
2010, resumed on Table 3, allow to conclude that the filter rules family is the one with 
higher average return, followed by support and resistance, channel breakouts and, finally, 
by the moving averages family, which is the only group presenting a negative average 
return. 
Regarding the average return of the best rule in each family, the filter rules is also the 
family with the best performing rule. The other families’ best rule have quite similar 
values, being the support and resistance the one with the worst performance. 
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In terms of the average duration of trade it is noticeable on Table 3 that the best performing 
rule in each family has much lower duration than the entire family average, being the only 
exception the filter rules, for which the duration of the best rule, although being smaller, it 
is much more closer to the average duration of the whole family. 
Contrarily, the number of trades presents the opposite trend. The average for the family is 
lower than the number of trades used by the best rule. Once again, the discrepancy in 
values is great with the exception of the filter rules. 
Still regarding the number of trades, the losing rules use, on average, more trades than the 
winning rules for 3 out of the 4 families. Only the channel breakouts winning rules are able 
to use more transactions than the losing ones. 
Additionally, Figure 3 reports the average returns in each year under analysis and then for 
the entire period. The returns are annualized with no consideration of costs, no benchmarks 
and without filtering for data mining. 
At a first glance it is apparent the high average return of most rules of the filter rules 
family, at least for the first three years, then the returns fade away and tend to be closer to 
zero, as most rules from the other trading families. 
On those first three years it is also noticeable that the group of rules belonging to the 
channel breakouts are the ones, by what seems to be a large margin, with worst 
performance overall. During that period, although there are a lot of rules on the moving 
average family which present negative returns, there are quite a few rules with higher 
returns than the best of the channel breakouts family. 
In the fourth year, as previously referred, there seems to be a reduction on the average 
return of most rules under the group of filter rules. The same can be said to occur to the 
moving averages and to the support and resistance rules. The opposite can be said for some 
rules of the channel breakouts, as they seem to improve. 
In the next four years the general conclusion that arises is the same. The filter rules, the 
moving averages and the support and resistance rules seem to decrease in returns, and most 
of rules of the channel breakouts tend to grow. 
In 2008 there is again some noticeable variation. Filter rules increase again in average 
return, assuming again the only positive values and the highest returns.  
Afterwards, in the next two years the average return absolute values tend to decrease, being 
closer to zero in all families of trading rules.  
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Finally, regarding the averages over the entire period of all trading rules tested, it is 
possible to attest that the ones with higher average return belong to the filter rules. This 
family is, also, the one that visibly has a better performance globally, since none of their 
rules are negative, and the worst one has a higher absolute value than some rules in the 
other three trading family rules.  
This can be better evaluated on Figure 4, where it is also possible to see that a good part of 
all rules on the moving averages family result on negative average return, whereas the 
other families seem to have only positive or null values. 
 
Table 3 – Average properties by trading family, for the entire period.1  
Rule Family FR MA SR CB 
Mean Return 3.8E-05 -1.0E-07 1.2E-05 7.0E-07 
Mean Return (Best) 7.5E-05 5.1E-05 4,6E-05 5.0E-05 
Mean Duration of Trade 128.3 67,507.0 31,636.0 388,136.4 
Mean Duration of Trade (Best) 121.2 131.9 39.4 229.1 
Mean Number of Trades 184,345.8 18,091.9 67,215.4 877.3 
Mean Number of Trades (Best) 185,952.0 89,782.0 227,465.0 50,986.0 
Mean Number of Winning Trades 48,897.5 5,953.4 13,308.2 404.7 
Mean Number of Winning Trades (Best) 69,989.0 26,103.0 44,251.0 26,248.0 
Mean Number of Losing Trades 77,951.7 6,051.0 20,442.5 35.5 
Mean Number of Losing Trades (Best) 115,960.0 45,220.0 72,288.0 57.0 
 
 
                                                 
1
 FR, MA, SR and CB are, respectively, the abbreviations for filter rules, moving averages, support and 
resistance and channel breakouts. 
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Figure 3 – Average annualized return, by year (annualized values). 
 
 
Figure 4 – Average return per rule, over the entire period (2000 to 2010), annualized 
values. 
 
The analysis to the returns using the own index as benchmark is identical to the preceding. 
By analyzing Figure 5 and Figure 6 it is not possible to discern both evaluations. 
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In fact, the conclusions that jump out are that for the first three years there are a lot of rules 
on the filter rules family that present high excess returns on average. This tends to fade 
away in the next three years, when a group of rules on the channel breakouts take the lead 
on the excess returns. From that period on that lead also disappears and most families of 
rules remain unchanged. 
 
 
Figure 5 – Average excess return over the buy and hold strategy, by year (annualized 
values). 
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Figure 6 - Average excess return over the buy and hold strategy, for the entire period 
(annualized values). 
The previous analysis sheds some light on the average excess return of the trading rules 
over the risk free rate. 
Indeed, it comes as no surprise that the filter rules are the ones with higher excess return 
for the first four years, and that after that there is a tendency for all rules to decrease the 
absolute value of the excess return, with an exception in 2008 (please refer to Figure 7). 
The major difference when comparing the average excess returns over the risk free rate, on 
Figure 7, to the returns over the buy and hold strategy, on Figure 6, is the magnitude of the 
negative excess return for almost half rules of the moving averages family. 
Additionally, it is possible to infer from Figure 8 that the results obtained over the entire 
period under consideration are very similar to the ones obtained using the index 
benchmark. 
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Figure 7 - Average excess return over the risk free rate, by year. 
 
 
Figure 8 - Average excess return over the risk free rate, for the entire period. 
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5.1.2. Duration of trades 
On Figure 9, Figure 10, Figure 11 and Figure 12 are presented the average duration of 
trade for each group of trading rules, the filter rules, the moving averages, the support and 
resistance and the channel breakouts, respectively. In each graph it is presented the annual 
average for all rules that belong to that group and then the annual average for the trading 
rule with better performance, also, from that group. 
The most relevant conclusion is that the best rule in each group has duration much lower 
than the average for the group, overall. 
Specifically, for the filter rules represented on Figure 9, the yearly average is on the 
interval from 9 to 15 periods of 5 minutes, or 45 to 75 minutes. Whereas the best rule 
duration is around the average of 2 periods, or 10 minutes, for 7 years, and for the other 4 
years goes as high as 31 and 50 periods (155 and 250 minutes, respectively). 
The moving averages (Figure 10) have higher durations than the filter rules, on average. 
The annual average is situated on the interval from 3000 to 3100 periods of 5 minutes, or 
15000 minutes to 15500 minutes. While the best rule average spends around 5 to 9 periods 
of 5 minutes (25 to 45 minutes), in total, on the market, with the exception of the year of 
2007, on which the best rule average duration is more than 60 periods (300 minutes). 
Consulting Figure 11 it is possible to infer that the support and resistance best rule duration 
ranges, on average, from 2 to 6 periods of 5 minutes (10 to 30 minutes) and the whole rules 
average around 1400 periods (7000 minutes). 
Moreover, the channel breakouts, with graph on Figure 12, have on average the highest 
time of trading. The group average is always more than 16000 periods of 5 minutes 
(80,000 minutes), and the best rule is on the interval from 5 to 75  (25 to 375 minutes), 
each year. 
Finally, Table 4 shows the difference between the average duration of trade for the entire 
family and the best rule. It stands out that even for the family presenting less discrepancy 
between its average and the best rule, it has almost 4 times the duration of the best rule. 
The other families’ discrepancy is, literally, multipliable by thousands. 
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Figure 9 – Mean duration of trade by year, for the Filter Rules group. 
 
 
Figure 10 - Mean duration of trade by year, for the Moving Averages group. 
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Figure 11 – Mean duration of trade by year, for the Support and Resistance group. 
 
 
Figure 12 - Mean duration of trade by year, for the Channel Breakouts group. 
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Table 4 - Comparison of the average trading duration for the entire period, by group of 
rules. 
Family of Trading Rules All Rules Best Rule All/Best 
Filter Rules 50.5 13.1 3.9 
Moving Averages 167,475.0 29.5 5,686.8 
Support and Resistance 78,480.0 10.9 7,233.2 
Channel Breakouts 755,000.0 55.3 13,652.8 
 
5.1.3. Number of trades 
The analysis on the number of trades for each group of rules allows to conclude that, for 
most years, the average annual number of trades in each trading group is lower than the 
annual average for the rule with the best performance in each of those families. 
On Figure 13, Figure 14, Figure 15 and Figure 16, we observe that the mean number of 
trades in each year is relatively constant, for the group average. In the opposite spectrum, 
the best rule for each group, doesn’t seem to be within a constant range of values through 
the years. 
Indeed, regarding the filter rules family, on Figure 13 we find that the best rule uses, in 
each year’s average, from 500 to 12000 transactions. Whereas the group average ranges 
from 7000 to 10000 transactions. 
The moving averages number of transactions, presented on Figure 14, is much more 
constant than the filter rules. The average for the best rule, with the exception of the year 
of 2007 when the number of transactions is just above 400, is higher than 3000 and lower 
than 5000, and the entire group has around 800 trades in each year for the period analyzed. 
For the support and resistance group of rules (Figure 15), the average number of trades is 
higher than for the moving averages, but still less than the filter rules. In fact, the group 
average assumes values around 3000 transactions each year, while the best rule surpasses 
several years the 4000 trades up to the 12000 mark. 
Finally, on Figure 16, we attest that the mean number of transactions for both the whole 
channel breakouts group and the best rule on the group is also quite variable. In the first 
three years the mean number is around 20 transactions, increasing in the next three years to 
the maximum value of 108 trades. From this point on, the value decreases again reaching a 
minimum of 7 transactions in 2008. The best rule presents exactly the same trend, with the 
only difference being the values, which range from 350 to 6000 trades. 
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Figure 13 - Mean number of trades by year, for the Filter Rules group. 
 
 
Figure 14 - Mean number of trades by year, for the Moving Averages group. 
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Figure 15 - Mean number of trades by year, for the Support and Resistance group. 
 
 
Figure 16 - Mean number of trades by year, for the Channel Breakouts group. 
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5.1.4. Number of winning and losing trades 
In this section I analyze the number of trades where the trading rules generate positive 
returns, from now on referred as winning trades, and when trades generate negative 
returns, entitled, from now on, as losing trades. 
In fact, Figure 17 shows that, in most years, the average winning filter rules use fewer 
transactions than the rule, from that subgroup, which generates higher returns. The same is 
also true for the losing trades, the average number of trades for the entire losing rules, for 
most years, are less than the ones used by the best rule of the losing rules. 
These conclusions are in line with the ones obtained from the previous analysis on the 
number of trades. The best trading rules tend to use more transactions. 
Having said that, the one different conclusion that can be drawn from the current analysis 
is that the winning trades undergo, on average, on fewer trades than the loosing ones. The 
same is relatable to the best trade in each situation (losing and winning), the best rule of the 
winning trades uses, on average, less trades than the best rule of the losing trades, in each 
year. 
Regarding the other families of trading rules the results are similar (Figure 18, Figure 19 
and Figure 20), with the channel breakouts, presented on Figure 20, the only exception. 
Indeed, the channel breakouts winning trades, both for the entire group and the best rule, 
have more transactions than the average for the losing trades. 
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Figure 17 - Mean number of winning/losing trades by year, for the Filter Rules group. 
 
 
Figure 18 - Mean number of winning/losing trades by year, for the Moving Averages 
group. 
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Figure 19 - Mean number of winning/losing trades by year, for the Support and Resistance 
group. 
 
 
Figure 20 - Mean number of winning/losing trades by year, for the Channel Breakouts 
group. 
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5.1.5. Returns 
The analysis of the mean returns per group of rules allows to easily deduce that most rules 
start by having positive and (mostly) constant average returns, in the first three years, but 
decrease afterwards, and, in some cases, they experience a new growth in 2008. 
In specific, this trend is seen on the filter rules (Figure 21), on the moving averages (Figure 
22) and on the support and resistance (Figure 23). The only exceptions to what has been 
said is the average for the entire set of rules for the moving averages and the channel 
breakouts, which register an annual value close to or equal to zero for most years, and the 
best rules average for the channel breakouts which records the opposite behavior compared 
to the other groups.  
 
 
Figure 21 – Mean return by year, for the Filter Rules group. 
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Figure 22 - Mean return by year, for the Moving Averages group. 
 
 
Figure 23 - Mean return by year, for the Support and Resistance group. 
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Figure 24 - Mean return by year, for the Channel Breakouts group. 
 
5.2. Superior Predictive Ability test 
The results obtained from the SPA test, presented on Table 5, allow to conclude that the 
null hypothesis is not rejected for any level (10, 5 or 1%) and over any of the sub-periods 
(years) analyzed.  
Indeed, the consistent value assumes its lowest value in the year of 2005, even though, 
being higher than 60%. In all other years, and in the entire period, the consistent value is 
around 80%. 
Therefore no rule appears to be able to provide an average return statistically higher than 
the one given by a buy and hold strategy. 
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Table 5 - SPA test results. 
Year Consistent Lower Upper 
2000 0.848 0.000 1.000 
2001 0.854 0.016 1.000 
2002 0.775 0.008 1.000 
2003 0.855 0.002 1.000 
2004 0.833 0.021 0.987 
2005 0.611 0.016 0.650 
2006 0.773 0.014 0.926 
2007 0.882 0.087 0.986 
2008 0.871 0.228 1.000 
2009 0.752 0.028 0.810 
2010 0.844 0.078 0.929 
All 0.974 0.000 1.000 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
Given the state of the art on this topic, and despite the ongoing debate, from the start my 
expectation was that technical trading rules would not be profitable even under a high-
frequency time frame. 
Nonetheless, more than 60 years after the first endeavors in this area there is still a lot of 
discussion on the topic. 
In addition, the literature on intraday technical trading alludes to a few simple conclusions. 
Such studies are relative recent, most of them, probably due to technical difficulties, use 
datasets no longer than one year, and most of them do not employ robustness tests. 
This study adds to the current literature by analyzing a substantially larger period of 
intraday data than previous studies, and by comparing the trading rules using the Superior 
Predictive Ability test (Hansen, 2005) to account for data snooping. 
 
6.1. Conclusions 
The results obtained do not leave much margin to interpretation. The fact is that the 5680 
technical trading rules tested do not generate abnormal returns. This attests for the 
efficiency of prices of the FTSE 100 index on the 11 years from January 2000 to December 
2010. 
Effectively, this is a conclusion obtained even without the consideration of transaction 
costs. The results obtained prior to the consideration of the SPA test by Hansen (2005), 
already seem to indicate that the rules tested do not outperform the market. The robustness 
test confirmed that, and the consideration of taxes and fees would only reinforce the 
results. 
Indeed, comparing to existing studies on this subject, at least the ones that account for data 
snooping and conduct, up to date, robustness tests, the conclusion is similar. The random 
walk hypothesis and the EMH hold. 
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Marshall et al. (2008), Duvignage et al. (2013) and Chaboud et al. (2014) are examples of 
studies that conduct similar tests over different markets/indexes with the consideration of 
data snooping measures, leading to the same conclusions. 
Studies like Wood et al. (1985), Los (1999), Busse and Green (2002), Cassese and 
Guidolin (2004), Chordia et al. (2005) and Manahov et al. (2014), besides being conducted 
on intraday datasets, they all have in common the fact that they state that markets are in 
some way inefficient and the non inclusion of robustness tests to their results, or the 
inclusion of outdated tests that are not the best to account for the results, overall, 
significance. 
In fact, here lies one of the most important achievements of this study, not only it provides 
evidence that FTSE 100 index price incorporates historical information, but also uses a 
robust test methodology. Being that the most likely cause for obtaining different results 
from similar studies. 
In addition, the analysis made on the duration and number of trades prompts a great insight 
on the value of most, if not all, technical trading rules tested. The fact is that for all groups 
of rules tested the best performing rule has much less time of exposure than the average for 
all rules. This means that the less time a portfolio is on the market for a given rule, the 
better is its performance. 
In fact, this can be indicative that the technical trading rules tested don’t generate value on 
their own merits, but their results may simply be due to luck and to a small exposure to the 
market. If that was not the case and if indeed the rules tended to increase value when used, 
the more time of usage the higher would be their returns, or at least its performance would 
not exhibit such a notorious inversely correlated pattern. 
 
6.2.  Suggestions for future research 
Even though the work accomplished was beyond the initial expectations, the technical 
challenges that derived from working with such a large dataset of returns and rules 
prevented me to explore the results even further. 
Although the current work makes a small contribution to the state of the art on the field of 
finance, in the sense it confirms the validity of the weak form of the EMH and the random 
walk hypothesis on an intraday dataset and using the SPA test, there is still a lot of room to 
improve this study in the future. 
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Firstly, the current study uses an index, and this is not a traded financial instrument, and 
consequently these results would not be easily replicated in practice by an investor. So, the 
usage of data from a tradable asset would be a substantial advantage. 
Secondly, a different set of technical trading rules could be used. Although the rules used 
in this study are fairly comprehensive, encompassing the most number of rules used in past 
research, some recent studies point out other types of rules that can be used. For example, a 
dynamic process to find trading rules can be used, in which an iterative process finds in 
each step the best combination of single parameters to be used on a given rule for it to 
achieve better performance. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1 – Observations out of chronological order (eliminated from 
the dataset). 
Date Time Price Date Time Price Date Time Price 
30/11/2009 08:00:54 5256.98 30/11/2009 10:00:45 5206.28 30/11/2009 11:36:27 5207.99 
30/11/2009 08:00:57 5261.92 30/11/2009 10:02:52 5208.25 30/11/2009 11:37:01 5210.29 
30/11/2009 08:01:23 5255.43 30/11/2009 10:03:38 5209.54 30/11/2009 11:47:09 5206.92 
30/11/2009 08:01:24 5255.43 30/11/2009 10:04:31 5209.84 30/11/2009 11:54:31 5208.29 
30/11/2009 08:02:41 5255.16 30/11/2009 10:07:09 5208.39 30/11/2009 11:55:27 5208.26 
30/11/2009 08:02:52 5255.28 30/11/2009 10:10:15 5205.07 30/11/2009 11:59:36 5207.62 
30/11/2009 08:04:01 5257.12 30/11/2009 10:12:22 5206.47 30/11/2009 12:00:02 5208.32 
30/11/2009 08:04:28 5258.34 30/11/2009 10:12:27 5206.81 30/11/2009 12:00:03 5208.51 
30/11/2009 08:04:30 5258.51 30/11/2009 10:13:09 5207.06 30/11/2009 12:00:05 5208.54 
30/11/2009 08:09:17 5252.79 30/11/2009 10:16:28 5196.70 30/11/2009 12:00:06 5208.60 
30/11/2009 08:13:44 5252.56 30/11/2009 10:20:05 5195.92 30/11/2009 12:00:08 5208.75 
30/11/2009 08:14:15 5250.02 30/11/2009 10:22:58 5199.50 30/11/2009 12:11:24 5206.58 
30/11/2009 08:16:10 5233.71 30/11/2009 10:26:13 5192.10 30/11/2009 12:12:39 5205.41 
30/11/2009 08:16:23 5232.89 30/11/2009 10:26:31 5192.64 30/11/2009 12:14:36 5207.62 
30/11/2009 08:16:55 5233.14 30/11/2009 10:35:02 5203.75 30/11/2009 12:31:49 5196.66 
30/11/2009 08:17:23 5229.98 30/11/2009 10:37:21 5204.75 30/11/2009 12:41:56 5200.06 
30/11/2009 08:21:03 5226.93 30/11/2009 10:40:22 5216.45 30/11/2009 12:52:01 5198.58 
30/11/2009 08:21:15 5227.54 30/11/2009 10:43:31 5215.16 30/11/2009 13:05:03 5205.37 
30/11/2009 08:22:45 5222.26 30/11/2009 10:47:24 5212.19 30/11/2009 13:05:07 5205.48 
30/11/2009 08:26:24 5224.33 30/11/2009 10:48:40 5213.46 30/11/2009 13:19:31 5209.64 
30/11/2009 08:37:41 5217.96 30/11/2009 10:51:09 5210.99 30/11/2009 13:25:57 5217.22 
30/11/2009 08:46:39 5218.88 30/11/2009 10:52:21 5209.92 30/11/2009 13:59:58 5212.20 
30/11/2009 08:56:34 5226.10 30/11/2009 10:59:12 5211.35 30/11/2009 14:21:50 5207.38 
30/11/2009 09:32:24 5214.44 30/11/2009 11:10:35 5199.85 30/11/2009 14:31:01 5216.86 
30/11/2009 09:35:15 5217.63 30/11/2009 11:12:52 5197.10 30/11/2009 15:02:01 5227.71 
30/11/2009 09:40:23 5212.91 30/11/2009 11:16:12 5198.88 30/11/2009 16:27:29 5199.45 
30/11/2009 10:00:37 5204.93 30/11/2009 11:17:56 5198.20 27/04/2010 14:40:11 5671.88 
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Appendix 2 – Trading Rules Parameters 
The parameters considered were the ones on Sullivan et al. (1999), with some adjustments 
to account for the fact that the database under evaluation is composed of intraday data, so 
all non-integer parameters were divided by the number of days on a year to the power of 
1/288, being 288 the number of 5 minutes periods in a trading day. 
rameterIntradayPa
eterDailyParam 



  1
365
1
288/1
 
 
2.1. Filter rules ݔ = change in price (ݔ × ���ܿ݁) required to initiate a position; ݕ = change in price (ݕ × ���ܿ݁) required to liquidate a position (must be less than ݔ); ݁ = used for an alternative definition of extrema where a low (high) can be defined as the 
most recent price that is less (greater) than the ݊ previous prices; ܿ = number of periods a position is held, ignoring all other signals during that time; ݔ = 0.0000173180024236608, 0.0000345503567567018, 0.0000516979074496327, 
0.000068761486518909, 0.0000857419137887394, 0.000102639997129561, 
0.000119456532687412, 0.000136192305112193, 0.000152848087775936, 
0.000169424642988858, 0.000202343066249888, 0.000234953459997911, 
0.000267261545283004, 0.000299272885145196, 0.000330992890382964, 
0.000393579811755806, 0.000455062754120661, 0.000515480054197104, 
0.000574868084739055, 0.000633261386471906, 0.000775104235773094, 
0.000911402104117887, 0.00116898911290808, 0.00140885646582789 [24 values]; ݕ = 0.0000173180024236608, 0.0000345503567567018, 0.0000516979074496327, 
0.000068761486518909, 0.0000857419137887394, 0.000102639997129561, 
0.000136192305112193, 0.000169424642988858, 0.000251144939873882, 
0.000330992890382964, 0.000485402291719561, 0.000633261386471906 [12 values]; ݁ = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 15, 20 [8 values]; ܿ = 5, 10, 25, 50 [4 values]. 
 
2.2. Moving averages ݊ = number of periods in a long period moving average; 
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݉ = number of periods in a short period moving average; ܾ = fixed band multiplicative value; ݀ = number of periods for the time delay filter; ܿ = number of periods a position is held, ignoring all other signals during that time; ݊ = 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 40, 50, 75, 100, 125, 150, 200, 250 [14 values]; ݉ = 2, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 40, 50, 75, 100, 125, 150, 200 [14 values]; ܾ = 0.0000034704932898, 0.0000173180024236608, 0.0000345503567567018, 
0.0000516979074496327, 0.000068761486518909, 0.000102639997129561, 
0.000136192305112193, 0.000169424642988858 [8 values]; ݀ = 2, 3, 4, 5 [4 values]; ܿ = 5, 10, 25, 50 [4 values]. 
 
2.3. Support and resistance ݊ = number of periods in the support and resistance range; ܾ = fixed band multiplicative value; ݀ = number of periods for the time delay filter; ܿ = number of periods a position is held, ignoring all other signals during that time; ݊ = 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 50, 100, 150, 200, 250 [10 values]; ܾ = 0.0000034704932898, 0.0000173180024236608, 0.0000345503567567018, 
0.0000516979074496327, 0.000068761486518909, 0.000102639997129561, 
0.000136192305112193, 0.000169424642988858 [8 values]; ݀ = 2, 3, 4, 5 [4 values]; ܿ = 5, 10, 25, 50 [4 values]. 
 
2.4. Channel Breakouts ݊ = number of periods for the channel; ݔ = difference between the high price and the low price (ݔ × ���ܿ݁) required to form the 
channel; ݀ = number of periods for the time delay filter; ܿ = number of periods a position is held, ignoring all other signals during that time; ݊ = 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 50, 100, 150, 200, 250 [10 values]; 
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ݔ = 0.0000173180024236608, 0.0000345503567567018, 0.000068761486518909, 
0.000102639997129561, 0.000169424642988858, 0.000251144939873882, 
0.000330992890382964, 0.000485402291719561 [8 values]; ݀ = 2, 3, 4, 5 [4 values]; ܿ = 5, 10, 25, 50 [4 values]. 
